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Since the 1970s, industrialised countries increasingly try to evaluate environmental 
hazards of chemicals substances. These evaluations are performed before chemicals 
are allowed to circulate through the world, but also of chemicals that have been 
produced for a long time. Prominent among these chemicals were the three groups 
that form the focus of this study: pesticides, effluent discharges to surface water, and 
industrial chemicals, including substances such as paint thinners or plastics. For these 
three groups of chemicals, complex regulatory procedures have been developed. For 
the construction and implementation of these procedures, rules have been established, 
agencies have been installed, toxicity tests developed, laws voted, new research 
institutes installed, international agreements made and broken, and scores of experts 
have been hired. Together, these heterogeneous elements form complex 
configurations, which in their combination produce evaluations of the size and 
acceptability of environmental hazards of chemicals; configurations we can call 
regulatory regimes. Even though complex and ramifying, in practice regulatory 
regimes are delimited by their jurisdiction, embedded in a law or a division of labour 
between government departments. 
 When comparing regulatory regimes, between countries or even between 
sectors of environmental policy, one quickly starts to notice differences in how 
evaluations of chemical hazards are organised and performed, in spite of a long 
tradition of harmonisation efforts. Different toxicity tests may be preferred or 
different sources of knowledge may be considered in the evaluations. Sometimes the 
evaluations are extremely formalised in very detailed protocols, while sometimes they 
depend almost entirely on expert judgement, cast in a very general legal mandate. 
Such differences are related to a wide variety of ways to integrate expertise in 
decision making, the different forms boundaries between experts and policy makers 
can take. This study analyses how these boundaries have taken shape in the regulation 
of wildlife hazards of chemicals in the US, England, and the Netherlands between 
1970 and 1995. In this period, aquatic hazards of chemicals were prominent on the 
agenda of regulatory research and policy and hence the study has focused on the 
evaluation of hazards to freshwater wildlife. 
 Ecologists and environmental toxicologists were the scientists who provided 
the expert knowledge on these hazards. There were some interesting boundaries 
between these research fields, contentious divisions of labour in the rich new 
professional domain of environmental regulation. Ecologists and environmental 
toxicologists frequently disagreed over what was the best approach to aquatic hazard 
evaluations. During the 1970s, environmental toxicologists had managed to produce a 
wide range of aquatic toxicity tests on the principle that the physiology of the 
individual organism provided the most practical and meaningful point of impact of 
toxicants. Hence, they set up tests with one single organism, with fish that could be 
easily raised in the laboratory, or with a small population of organisms of the same 
species, such as the water flea Daphnia magna. In these ‘single species tests’, a series 
of organisms would be put in a series of test tanks containing water of known 
composition, including known concentrations of a toxicant. After a certain period, the 
experimenter would count how many of these organisms were still alive. From these 
measurements, it was statistically inferred at which concentration of toxicant 50% of 
the organisms would survive. Therefore, the most important deleterious effect of a 
chemical that was tested in this approach was individual mortality, based on the 
physiological capacity of an organism to survive a relatively brief exposure to a 
substance. From these measurements, extrapolations were then made to the natural 
environment. 
 Ecologists, on the other hand, had major objections to this approach and 
tended to favour multispecies tests, in which several species of organisms would be 
present in a test tank or pond. They argued that the reductionism of the individual 
organism was not a good representation of actual effects in the environment. For 
example, an organism could perhaps survive, but might become slower and thus an 
easy prey for predators, disturbing food web relations. In other words: ecologists 
argued that even if little or no mortality was measured, other negative effects could 
arise at ecological levels of analysis. Environmental toxicologists objected to the high 
cost of multispecies tests, as well as the lack of one clear indicator of toxicity. In 
addition, they argued, the evaluation of environmental hazards of chemicals was not 
an issue of precise prediction, but of effective protection of the environment. By 
means of considerable safety margins, to compensate for the extrapolation from single 
species test results to the complexities of natural environments, single species were 
defended as affordable and reliable indicators of environmental hazards. 
 In order to describe the processes of standardisation of toxicity tests, I 
suggested the simple mnemonic of texts, objects, and people (TOP). Standardisation 
of toxicity tests, being the stabilisation of test results in the specific locations for 
which they were designed, could be achieved through all three of these elements and 
by using one to calibrate the other. For example, one of the effects regulatory experts 
envisaged with standardisation was that toxicity tests would provide reliable results 
even when performed in different laboratories. In order to guarantee this reliability, 
they could rely on the competency of trained researchers. However, the trajectory 
chosen in the US was to rely first and foremost on objects and textual and instruments 
of standardisation. Over the years, test protocols became highly detailed ‘cook books’, 
indicating how to raise fish, how to build fish tanks, or exactly what fish feed to use. 
These cook books could also rely on the predictability of already standardised objects, 
such as the glass and glues available for building fish tanks, or even the reliable 
composition of commercially available bottled mineral water. In coupling these 
instruments, we see the familiar bootstrapping of standardisation processes: standards 
build on other standards, strung together to frame newly stabilised practices. As an 
extra guarantee, toxicologists also developed methods of calibration, for example by 
performing toxicity tests in different labs with test materials from one central source. 
 A detailed analysis of the development of these tests over a period of more 
than two decades provides interesting insights into the arguments between ecologists 
and environmental toxicologists, while shedding light on the boundary work between 
the two research fields. For example, single species testing started with relatively 
large fish in natural conditions, exposed to chemicals over longer periods in so-called 
chronic toxicity tests. The cost of these tests was comparable to a small multispecies 
test, but years of investment in the development of chronic outdoor tests produced 
shorter, less labour intensive, ever cheaper and more standardised tests. The 
standardisation meant that these tests could be performed with personnel of lower 
qualification. With a delay of about ten years, similar attempts at standardisation were 
made for multispecies tests, but by that time, single species had such a large head start 
that multispecies tests seemed excessively expensive and ambiguous. 
 In addition, a comparison between regulatory regimes provides some 
interesting differences with respect to the acceptability of test results. What is ‘too 
ambiguous’ a test result appears to vary widely between regulatory regimes. Highly 
standardised single species tests appeared to function particularly well in regulatory 
regimes that aspired to a strict separation of ‘scientific’ and ‘political’ aspects of 
regulatory decision making, using highly formalised procedures for the evaluation of 
environmental hazards. Such regulatory regimes were typical of the US. In regulatory 
regimes relying more on expert judgement, usually involving more informal 
negotiation with applicants, results of multispecies tests were more readily considered 
in the evaluations. In some cases of evaluation of pesticide hazards in England, these 
results even involved multispecies tests that had been rejected in the US for being 
‘insufficiently standardised’. 
 In comparing regulatory regimes within the US, varying strategies followed in 
attempts to introduce multispecies tests in regulatory evaluations show how 
standardisation operates in regulatory regimes where the possibility of deconstruction 
by counter expertise in a legal setting is always a background threat. By means of 
long and extensive consensus building among experts from industry, government 
agencies, and universities, regulatory hazard evaluations become more predictable, to 
the advantage of all parties involved. 
 Because of such processes, varying structures in regulatory decision making 
have consequences for what kind of knowledge can and cannot be taken into 
consideration and for the kind of knowledge that will be stimulated as potentially 
useful by regulatory agencies – and hence for the selective opportunities of research 
fields to develop. In the US, the most resourceful actors in the evaluation of 
environmental hazards, the Environmental Protection Agency and the chemical 
industry, were also by far the largest financers of regulatory research. In the 
Netherlands, in contrast, science policy was more involved in the efforts to develop 
knowledge of use for regulatory decision making, for example in the form of 
interdepartmental funding initiatives. This both mitigated the pressure from evaluation 
procedures to selectively support the already advantaged single species tests and 
created new opportunities to develop ecological research on pollution into practicable 
expertise. The selective chances to participate in regulatory regimes hence also 
created selective chances for ecology and environmental toxicology (and 
interdisciplinary efforts) to develop, varying with different structures and strategies of 
regulatory regimes. 
 A nice illustration of these selective opportunities is the debate between 
ecologists and ecologists over the meaning of the term ‘ecotoxicology’. Starting in the 
early eighties, ecologists tried to mobilise the new buzzword to argue for a stronger 
integration of environmental toxicology and ecology. (To stay neutral in the debate, I 
use eco/toxicology to refer to both fields together, including whatever boundary is 
advocated or organised between them.) Both fields were to conglomerate in a new 
research field. In the US, this project led to disillusionment; in the UK to limited 
success; while in the Netherlands ‘ecotoxicology’ became a more popular albeit 
contested concept, often presented as a cooperation between disciplines on an equal 
footing. 
 The historic boundaries in eco/toxicology cannot be reduced to the 
opportunities these fields managed to secure in regulatory regimes. Eco/toxicologists 
themselves were the experts who signalled the hazards of pollution and advocated 
them onto political agendas in the sixties and seventies. They helped to identify and 
define what are environmental hazards and from there on were crucial in the 
construction of the regulatory regimes that were to deal with these new problems. A 
closer look at these early and formative periods shows that ecologists actually 
originally played a more prominent role in the evaluation of environmental hazards of 
chemicals. In addition, the sometimes locally sharp boundary between ecology and 
environmental toxicology is a boundary that was created only later, as regulatory 
regimes started to take shape. In contrast to ecology, environmental toxicology 
developed almost exclusively in the shadow of regulatory regimes, especially in the 
seventies, when ecologists were just carving out a relatively stable position for 
themselves at universities. Here too, the pattern is somewhat different for the 
Netherlands, where a relatively large group of even university ecologists remained 
involved in environmental hazard assessments. 
 Remarkable about England was that there was a strong separation between the 
experts who were involved in policy making and scientists at universities. Only from 
the early nineties onward did university researchers become somewhat more involved 
in regulatory eco/toxicology in England. Up until that time, regulatory agencies relied 
mostly on experts from their own research institutes, from whom could be expected 
that they stuck to the culture of strong secrecy and identified with the closed elite of 
regulatory decision makers. The pattern can be identified as that of a royal court, 
relying on personal trust and shared conviction, rather than rules or standardised test 
devices (i.e. people, rather than texts and objects). 
 Regulatory regimes are hence organised around complex and contested 
divisions of labour. Two recurring ones in the regimes evaluating chemical hazards 
are the division of labour between policy makers and experts, and the division of 
labour between different research fields, in these case primarily eco/toxicology. There 
is a lot of activity involved in these divisions of labour: actors try to make distinctions 
where others try to efface them, try to construct or disrupt cooperation, try to redefine 
terms of mutual engagement. These are the activities we call boundary work. It is not 
only performed by attempting to redefine the relations between people, but also by 
deploying discursive and material devices. The results of boundary work can in turn 
be embedded in new social patterns of interaction, in material objects such as toxicity 
tests, or in the rules of the textual device of a test protocol. Computer models, toxicity 
tests, or assessment protocols distribute issues between what is to be considered the 
domain of expertise and the domain of policy, the work that has been performed by 
experts and the work of evaluating outcomes that is left to policy makers. In the 
complex world of regulatory regimes, concatenations of texts, objects, and people are 
mobilised to establish, reproduce, stabilise, or shift boundaries, demarcating what can 
and cannot be considered true and necessary, what can and cannot constitute an issue 
of choice. To the extent that these devices give rise to routinised practices, we can 
therefore speak of ‘boundaries’, the institutionalised counterpart of ‘boundary work’. 
 One a theoretic level, this approach is presented as an alternative to two 
extreme positions in science and technology studies, which use diametrically opposed 
approaches to boundaries. The first can be called the ‘cage model’ and can be found 
most clearly in functionalist sociology of science, such as of Talcott Parsons or more 
recently Niklas Luhmann. This approach proposes to identify the key criteria to 
establish a priori which activities or communications do and do not belong to 
‘science’ and which must be marked as, for example, ‘politics’. Consequently, this 
analytic demarcation is used to describe what occurs within these institutional 
confines, or at best to show how both domains exchange with each other. In the 
opposing model of the seamless network, every form of a priori distinction between 
science and politics is abandoned. This tradition, found in its most extreme form in 
Actor Network Theory, refuses to establish any kind of analytic boundary, but 
chooses to show how science and politics are inextricable enmeshed. 
 Both traditions have great difficulty in describing the complex divisions of 
labour of regulatory regimes. They tend to reduce the negotiations over shifting 
boundaries to misrepresentations, either by imposing analytic distinctions between 
science and policy that are of very limited practical use (‘independent science’), or by 
discarding these negotiations as rather trivial skirmishes in a network that is actually 
seamless, trying to establish distinctions where there are none (‘politics is 
everywhere’). Consequently, both traditions create unnecessary difficulty in relating 
to the practices of organising and reorganising boundaries in expertise used for 
decision making, and in weighing the strengths and weaknesses of different models 
for these divisions of labour. The opposition between both extreme models, the cage 
and the seamless network, is one of the hurdles STS needs to take in order to 
contribute to the debates on how scientific expertise can or should be organised. 
Boundaries of regulatory science can be taken seriously, without reifying them, 
landing in essentialist criteria for what is ‘science’; or nullifying them, landing in a 
tempting but ultimately meaningless holism. 
This approach implies that STS needs to develop more attention for political 
theory and cannot continue to use participatory democracy as a stopgap for all 
complex issues involved in the divisions of labour between and among experts and 
policy makers. Attention for boundaries force us to face the sticky question of who 
should be included, and who should not, what is to be a issue on the precious but also 
inherently limited political agenda of our democratic institutions and what relegated 
to the technical. 
The analysis of boundaries in regulatory regimes from the perspective of STS 
also contributes to the comparative study of environmental regulation. In contrast to 
the analysis in policy sciences, STS digs deeper in the role experts play in the 
construction and implementation of regulatory policy. By bringing the role of experts 
and the varying patterns in science/policy boundaries, it can be shown how 
boundaries relate to typical ‘national styles of regulation’, but also that national styles 
do not hold equally strong in all regulatory regimes. In fact, some regulatory regimes 
appear to resemble regimes in the same sector in other countries more than in other 
sectors in the same country. It appears that the international networks of experts can 
provide the channels by which this institutional isomorphism is created, not only 
because of the relatively international orientation of expert communities, but also 
because boundaries embedded in texts and objects transport models of science/policy 
boundaries from one regulatory context to another. 
